Restricting Security Administrators from updating F9312

LokomotivRosco

Member
What is the best way to do this effectively. AND have a monitoring/flag control in place so that when they change any existing security on F9312 some kind of watchdog gets notified.

This is so we can have a truly effective control in place to stop sec admins from "covering their tracks"

Is there any way to run a report at the Oracle level that looks specifically for changes to the row security settings of F9312?
 
Talk to your DBA about creating a database trigger on the table.
 
Just wondering whether anyone else has come across this "loophole". I know that the security admins are "God" within JDE but they can't be God and also have the ability to mop up after themselves (by deleting lines from F9312).

We already have row security restricting delete and change for F9312 at *PUBLIC. But that line of security can easily be changed by a sec admin OR they can grant it back to themselves.

Here's a scenario I have though through...

1. Disgruntled security admin wants to leave the company a nice surprise on their last day (but doesn't want to get caught)...

2. They grant themselves the ability to delete lines of security from F9312

3. They grant themselves *ALL object access

4. They run amock in the system messing up master data, data dictionary posting all sorts of nonsense to the GL etc etc

5. They go back to the security history log and remove the lines that showed that they made F00950 changes/adds (hiding their tracks from steps 2 and 3)

6. They run away happy in the knowledge that they've cost the company millions of dollars and resourse time to fix issues - and they can't get caught because nobody can prove it was them that did it...

...and yes, I'm an auditor
wink.gif


Like to hear peoples opinions on potential fixes for this though...
 
The only thing I could think of is that all developers and CNC must be carefully selected and well paid, so that there's never any reason for this to happen. Plus, it would help if they are all local - in your jurisdiction ;-)

Yes, this includes all the Developers too: with any development access (even to develop Versions, because they may have ER overrides), anything can be done with the system. Quite easily, actually.

And so, if you cannot trust these people, all sorts of things can happen and the available protection is only a very thin veil to protect only from the lazy and/or ignorant - anyone with knowledge, time and desire can break it in no time.

It turns out that JDE even offers simple ways to read the other users' passwords. So there's even no need to clean up: you can just sign in as your manager and do all of that.

I honestly could never see any ways to reliably control this to any degree at all. Or else, I would have probably developed some software to do it ;-)
 
Aahhh...auditors, it depends on how paranoid one deals with these such scenarios...since anything can happen approach.

I was once ask these kinds of paranoid scenarios. It depends on one's paranoia...we can make it more complex.
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Isn't this a moot point as there is no way of updating the F9312 via a standard JDE APPL/UBE so the only way they could cover their tracks is through SQL. If they've got SQL then..........
 
I think you're wasting your time on seeking the answer for a cyclical question. You're really focussing on one tree and not seeing the entire forest.

What if the DBA who has the admin account also knows JDE and locks people out of the system?

What if the Developer who has read/write access to the system creates a program that changes security, elevates their permissions and starts cutting themselves cheques?

Just the first of many "what if" questions.

Fortunately most auditors bill hourly so solving these 2 additional question should net your company lots of additional hours.

Colin
 
Thanks for your replys so far.

Colin, of course, the "what if" scenario I detailed above is just one of many. The fact remains that JDE has a loophole here. A flaw in the design that means you cannot fully restrict security admins from manipulating the security log (the only tool that can be used to monitor their activity).

I'd like to understand if there are any fixes out there that people know of?

(It's also my opinion that there maybe aren't enough people being "paranoid" out there, it's the only way we cn improve our invironments and make our systems safer, more stable and more efficient. More people should be asking "why?" not just accepting things for what they are.
wink.gif
 
What if during the millions of data extracts that the lovely auditor is requesting he is coming across the password of the account payable employee and now cuts a cheque to his brother in law working as a vendor for this company under the name of someone else and since he knows the flaws of the system he know also how to hide his own trace, what if the auditors don't shred all the confidential paper we gave him but put them to recycle bin and endup in a criminals hand, what if we are currently helpinp tons of person to better crack the system and hide their trace, what if we are just having too much confidence in a person that can ask why but would not understand the answer any way !! Not sure why you are asking if it is possible, everything is possible, SOX is a way to make you beleive we are safer but it just forced people to find new ways to hack the system just like when McAfee find a solution to the newly introduced virus out there, someone will bypass 5 minutes later. I know no 100% bullet proof solution in any ERP out there.

my 2 cents .... (I feel better now, let me get a coffee)
 
"More people should be asking "why?" not just accepting things for what they are."

Nice to meet another RFK fan:

There are those who look at things the way they are, and ask why... I dream of things that never were, and ask why not? Robert Kennedy

Are we letting the craziness begin?

Andy
 
[ QUOTE ]
Disgruntled security admin wants to leave the company a nice surprise on their last day (but doesn't want to get caught)......and yes, I'm an auditor.

Like to hear peoples opinions on potential fixes for this though...

[/ QUOTE ]

<font color="yellow">Suggested Afterthoughts:</font><font color="red"> Prosecute to the full extent of the law </font>
 
Sorry didn't mean to be short here but most on this forum run into the situation where auditors pitch crap over the wall to see if it will stick all the time.

My general sugestion would be for IT Auditors to more a little more about IT other than just the "system process" or "general controls" or "master data protection" or "segregation of duties". How about learning networking, SQL or even a little bit about the application being audited?

My ideal auditor would suggest the high level issue, some possible courses of action and not LASER BEAM on one silly item.

In this specific case the target is the F9312. The ideal auditor would suggest "A method to ensure that the Security Administrator is restricted from altering the security audit table within the system. Another individual would have access to the history table for maintenance purposes and thus collusion would have to occur between the Security Administrator and this other individual".

Now the fact that you've pointed out that you can't do this in JDE is not a short coming of the product but merely a lack of insight. Since each auditor or firm will general recommend opposite things depending on which way the wind is blowing that day there is no system that can account for all of this.

So since this can't be done in JDE........well don't do it in JDE.

We have a few fundamental items in play here: (1) Network, (2) Database, (3) Application. So we have 3 areas to layer security to gain the desired effect.

In this case I think the issue can be solved at the database level with a few statements:

REVOKE ALTER, DELETE ON sy812.F9312 FROM *PUBLIC;
GRANT ALTER, DELETE, INSERT, SELECT, UPDATE ON sy812.F9312 TO PROXYID1;
GRANT ALTER, DELETE, INSERT, SELECT, UPDATE ON sy812.F9312 TO PROXYID2;
GRANT ALTER, DELETE, INSERT, SELECT, UPDATE ON sy812.F9312 TO PROXYID3;

etc, etc.

So the simple answer would be to revoke the ALTER and DELETE permissions on the table to all database userids.


Just my $0.02 US, $0.0197 CDN

Colin
 
Hi Colin,

Didn't you forget that security admin can still conive with the DB admin or the DB admin has perhaps some evil plans with the system...
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We could be staring at the moon and ask why Oracle didn't do that as default?
confused.gif


[ QUOTE ]
"I know that the security admins are "God" within JDE but they can't be God and also have the ability to mop up after themselves (by deleting lines from F9312)."

[/ QUOTE ]
 
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Disgruntled security admin wants to leave the company a nice surprise on their last day (but doesn't want to get caught)......and yes, I'm an auditor.

Like to hear peoples opinions on potential fixes for this though...

[/ QUOTE ]

It means the HR team hiring so much trustworthy & faithfull people. Sack the HR Team, as they are so successful to find such worthy Security administrators....!!!!!!!!!"
 
[ QUOTE ]
More people should be asking "why?" not just accepting things for what they are.
wink.gif


[/ QUOTE ]

Only Human ask questions like "Why? / What? / How? / When?" etc. So, Define what is your requirements?
 
We have advised and setup configurations to cope with this at various sites. The long and short of it is that if you have 2 machines you can achieve this.

If you do not, the next best is that you can have reports and audits - and you can get these to print automatically.

Most sites try and have a segregation of duties between someone with access to JDE as opposed to access to the database - although obviously if the database person has enough knowledge access to JDE can always be enabled, it is not so easy to do this without leaving a trail.
 
Here's a late reply Rosco,

1. You may be confusing JDE Admin with Database Admin. Granted in small companies they frequently are the same - but generally not in mid-size or larger companies. Disabling Database triggers that act as a audit logs (or a tool such as Log-Miner) would require collusion between admins to cover tracks.

2. The "hole" you mention applies to most software. Whether it is email systems or ERP systems.

3. Even regular, non-admin users can "run amok" within their areas of influence. In fact, most of us spend a certain amount of time each week cleaning up situations caused by people who "post all sorts of nonsense" just because they don't have a clue - not because they were purposely out to damage the company.

4. Tightening down controls, segregation of duties, etc can make it harder for someone to do intentional damage, but rarely impossible. What it does do is make it harder for people to do their jobs efficiently - which also damages the company . . . it is of course a matter of risk asessment.

Just My Opinion,
 
Larry jones,

I am fully agreeing with your view. This is true even with credible and highly dependable people.

"Tightening down controls, segregation of duties, etc can make it harder for someone to do intentional damage, but rarely impossible. What it does do is make it harder for people to do their jobs efficiently - which also damages the company . . . it is of course a matter of risk asessment"

Some times the efficiency and deliverable indirectly proportional to the control. So it is a trade off.
 
I'd like to thank everyone for their input.

I didn't really want this thread to turn into a debate on the "purpose" of auditors or their technical expertise or the ethics and "trustworthyness" of administrators. We all have opinions on these things...

I'd like to focus on the responses from Colin Dawes and Larry Jones who actually provided real suggested solutions - thanks guys.

I think we've assertained that there is probably nothing that can be done within the JDE application itself to "fix" this. So the concentration should be on providing a solution on the database side.

I know I focussed on F9312 for this scenario but the same could be true for any DB table. I guess if you really want to lock these down from All JDE users ability to delete/modify (or even add) then this can only be done within the database. From a compliance perspective then it would be a case of an SOD check so that the DBAs don't also have Sec Admin permissions in the application.

Thanks again!
 
JDE has the database lock down already documented.

Search the Support site (support.oracle.com) for the following:

rp_e1_sqlserverpublicshutdown.pdf

or

rp_e1_oraclepublicshutdown.pdf
 
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